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5ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
most notably a shift towards auctioning of emission 
allowances, rather than giving them out at no charge. This 
change will have implications for financial reporting.
The mAin reseArCh Aims And objeCTives
The project had five aims.
To survey the treatment of carbon emission allowances •	
within the financial statements of large EU ETS emitters 
in order to establish a baseline understanding of 
current accounting practices.
To assess awareness and knowledge of the IASB/FASB •	
Emissions Trading Schemes project, and to evaluate its 
likely effect on current and future choices of financial 
accounting approach.
To establish an understanding of opinions on how to •	
resolve the absence of accounting guidance for 
emission allowances.
To explore the theoretical implications of the research •	
findings. 
To disseminate the research findings to a range of •	
policy and academic audiences in order to illuminate 
the political and institutional challenges and 
opportunities that exist for governing the financial 
accounting treatment and reporting of emission 
allowances.
There is a practical, policy need for the research (because 
of the lack of comprehensive up-to-date information about 
financial accounting practices in the EU ETS, in what has 
been a fast-moving area), and it has important conceptual 
aspects because carbon financial accounting is in its 
formative stages. Rules and practices are still ‘hot’ or 
unsettled, and there is a significant opportunity to 
investigate how new accounting rules and practices arise. 
A key objective of this ACCA research project, conducted in 
partnership with the International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA), is to open up the debate on carbon 
financial accounting to a wider international audience.
meThod
We adopted a two-stage approach to surveying the 
accounting choices of corporate players in the EU ETS: a 
survey of financial statement disclosures, and a series of 
telephone interviews. For the financial statement survey, 
we conducted a desk-based review and analysis of 
statements of the largest emitters within the EU ETS for 
the year 2008, in order to establish their accounting 
treatment of carbon emissions. The choice of the 
companies surveyed was dictated by a desire to capture 
disclosure data for at least 25% of all EU ETS carbon 
emissions. This 25% cut-off point ensured that we included 
in our survey the emission allowance accounting practices 
of the main polluters, because emissions are most likely to 
be material to their accounts. We selected 68 installations 
inTroduCTion
This report investigates how large emitters in the European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) are accounting 
for emission allowances. The research involved a detailed 
survey of the financial statements of the largest 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in the EU ETS (26 
companies). This was followed by telephone interviews 
with accountants at five of these companies to explore in 
detail why accounting practices vary. Since the EU ETS 
commenced in 2005 there have been no firm rules about 
how to account for emission allowances, and this uncertain 
situation has allowed a range of accounting models to 
flourish. The survey corroborates previous research (PwC 
and IETA 2007), revealing that a diversity of emission 
allowance accounting practices are being used in Europe. 
The research is relevant for commercial reasons. 
Specifically, the value of emission allowances traded in the 
EU ETS is large – worth US$92 billion/€63 billion in 2008 
– which suggests that carbon accounting should provide 
information about the impact of climate change policies 
(especially those concerning carbon reductions) on 
corporations active in this market. Moreover, in the 
absence of international accounting guidance there is 
currently no uniform financial accounting treatment for 
emission allowances. The findings suggest that 
comparable information about the relative performance of 
firms in the EU ETS cannot be discerned from carbon-
related disclosures. This situation is unsatisfactory for 
individual corporations as well as actual and potential 
users of financial report information.
In 2008, the Emissions Trading Schemes project was 
relaunched by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), in conjunction with the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The remit of the 
IASB/FASB project includes the accounting of all tradable 
emissions rights and obligations arising under emissions 
trading schemes, as well as the accounting for activities 
undertaken in contemplation of receiving tradable rights in 
future periods. Recommendations on accounting 
treatment in this area will have the greatest impact on 
companies in Europe because of the EU ETS, and this is 
the main reason why our study focuses on current 
disclosure practices of firms that are subject to the EU 
ETS. Further, with the globalisation of carbon markets on 
the horizon, the method of carbon accounting in the EU 
ETS will have increasing international relevance. 
To date, financial accounting has been the rather 
overlooked bedrock of carbon markets, and deserves more 
attention in international negotiations and elsewhere. In 
contrast with other issues in carbon markets, where there 
has been both government involvement and extensive 
public debate, decision making in carbon financial 
accounting appears to be taking place among a much 
smaller group of well-connected experts. Because the 
IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes project is due to 
publish an Exposure Draft in late 2011, the research is 
timely. Moreover, significant changes to emissions trading 
in Europe are expected in Phase 3 of the EU ETS (2013–20), 
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6from the European Commission’s Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL), which equate to those responsible 
for approximately 26% of the EU ETS total verified emissions 
in 2008. The companies owning the installations were then 
identified via Internet searches, with 26 organisations 
collectively owning these 68 installations. During stage two 
of the research, all 26 companies were invited for a short 
follow-up telephone interview (of 15 to 30 minutes’ 
duration) to explore in more detail why they adopted the 
accounting practices they did; from where they sought and 
obtained advice and information in this area; their opinions 
on possible future changes to EU ETS accounting; and the 
role of accounting standard setters in this context. Five 
interviews were conducted, a response rate of 19%.
The reseArCh findings
The main finding from the research is that large emitters 
in the EU ETS are using a diversity of accounting practices 
to account for emission allowances: there is no uniformity 
of treatment (see Table). 
Additional key findings are as follows.
Companies’ accounting practices for revealing their  
overall position on emission allowances (as net assets or 
liabilities) vary hugely, with no discernible pattern in 
accounting treatment.
A large proportion of surveyed companies (42%, or 11  
out of 26 companies) treat emission allowances as 
intangible assets. This means that the allowances are 
measured in company accounts ‘at cost’. If allowances 
were obtained by the company at no cost they are 
shown, therefore, as having nil value but if emission 
allowances were purchased they have a cost associated 
with them in the accounts.
Of the companies surveyed, 31% (eight companies) are  
accounting for granted carbon allowances at nil value 
(on the basis that allowances are granted at no charge). 
Only 15% (or four companies) are accounting for 
emission allowances initially at fair value with the 
difference between fair value and cost recognised as a 
governmental grant and presented as deferred income 
on the balance sheet.
Most of the companies are measuring their obligation to  
surrender allowances on a ‘cost with the balance at 
market value’ basis (58%, or 15 companies). That is, 
valuation is based on the carrying value of those 
allowances already granted or purchased (as this is at 
cost, a figure usually close to zero), while (if applicable) 
valuing at the market value the allowances that still 
need to be purchased to cover actual emissions.
Most of the companies do not disclose any information  
on amortisation/depreciation (69%, or 18 companies) 
or revaluation of emission allowances (50%, or 13 
companies). 
Information on Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)  
was not provided by most companies (77%, or 20 
companies).
Interviews with accountants confirmed that they find it  
difficult to account for emission allowances and 
revealed a guidance role for auditors in the absence of 
an international accounting standard. In addition, 
interviews provided evidence that accountants would 
generally welcome the prospect of international 
accounting guidance in this area (expected, at the time 
of writing, in late 2011). 
summary of results: survey of eu eTs top emitters’ 
financial reports
Emission allowance accounting Disclosure summary*
Granted allowances – initial 
recognition
Intangible assets – 42% 
No disclosure – 27%
Purchased allowances – initial 
recognition
Intangible assets – 42% 
No disclosure – 27%
CERS - initial recognition No disclosure – 77%
Granted allowances – 
measurement on initial 
recognition
Nil value – 31% 
No disclosure – 23% 
Fair value – 15%
Amortization/Depreciation of 
emission allowances
No disclosure – 69% 
Re-valuation of emission 
allowances
No disclosure – 50% 
Measurement of liabilities 
 
Cost with balance at market value 
– 58% 
No disclosure – 23%
 
* all percentages shown are percentages of the total survey responses 
(26 companies) – they are not the % results of only those companies that 
are disclosing. 
As the table above illustrates, there are diverse accounting 
treatments of emission allowances in the EU ETS. This 
situation has arisen because of a lack of accounting 
guidance from standard setters in the period 2005–10. 
Companies in the EU ETS are currently free to choose their 
preferred accounting method for emission allowances (as 
long as it is accepted by their auditor). This flexibility 
brings both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage 
is that companies can choose the accounting method that 
suits their business best and/or that is easiest and 
simplest for them to apply. The disadvantages are that 
comparison between companies is not possible, and that 
companies may need to spend a great deal of time and 
resources adopting different accounting models for 
emission allowances in order to satisfy different regulators, 
parent companies, and auditors. 
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The diversity in accounting practice means that the 
company accounts of large EU ETS emitters cannot in 
most cases be directly compared, despite the possibility 
that emission allowances will be material to the accounts. 
With a shift to auctioning of allowances in Phase 3 of the 
EU ETS there are likely to be accounting implications: not 
least that companies will no longer be able to account for 
assets and liabilities at nil value (because allowances will 
no longer be given out at no charge, but will need to be 
paid for). Our interviews reveal that companies appear not 
to be thinking ahead about this issue.
Our interviews also establish that most companies appear 
ready to welcome firm guidance from the accounting 
standard setters, to reduce complexity for them and to 
allow them to be fairly compared with their peers. Even so, 
rather surprisingly in light of this, few companies have 
been tracking the progress of the IASB/FASB Emissions 
Trading Schemes project, and they have had little (if any) 
direct engagement with IASB or FASB. 
There are networks where companies discuss emission 
allowance accounting issues (eg the International Energy 
Accounting Forum), but participation among interviewees 
is variable, with some companies having no such 
discussions with their peers and instead relying heavily on 
their auditor for advice. In the continuing absence of 
international accounting standards, the role of auditors has 
been important, with most companies interviewed seeking 
information and reassurance from auditors about their 
accounting model, and auditors playing a role in 
establishing best practice through issuing guidance (KPMG 
2008).
In terms of the theoretical contribution of the research, this 
study makes a significant contribution to an emerging 
body of work on carbon accounting, especially in adding to 
its empirical depth. It confirms that there is nothing yet 
habitual about carbon accounting practices (in contrast to 
much of accounting, which is ‘black-boxed’ and routine), 
thereby making it an interesting and informative case 
study. Emission allowances are hard to classify: they are a 
type of ‘incommensurable’ because there are multiple 
potential uses of carbon credits – as a commodity, a 
currency, a financial instrument and so on – and 
accounting practitioners in the EU ETS are trying to deal 
with this complexity. Through this struggle to define and 
manage emission allowances, EU ETS accountants are 
playing a role (albeit currently a rather quiet, hidden one) 
in influencing how the problem of climate change is 
understood and governed. 
reseArCh impliCATions And poliCy 
reCommendATions
We recommend that accounting standard setters issue 
clear guidance on emission allowance accounting as soon 
as is practical (note that the timetable has already slipped 
from the expectation of an Exposure Draft in 2009 to late 
2011). For large emitters in the EU ETS, emission 
allowances may already be material to their accounts, and 
their significance will increase with a shift to auctioning of 
allowances in EU ETS Phase 3 (commencing in 2013). A 
level playing field is required to allow fair and transparent 
comparison of EU ETS company accounts. 
We recommend that large emitters in the EU ETS work 
more with each other, and with auditors and other 
technical accounting experts, to try to harmonise 
accounting practices in the run up to the issue of draft 
guidance by IASB/FASB in late 2011. This could, for 
example, be through the existing Emission Rights project 
led by the International Energy Accounting Forum, or 
through the establishment of new working groups, 
networks and projects by appropriate organisations (such 
as IETA, ACCA, or others). We also recommend that these 
groups engage wherever possible with IASB and FASB to 
keep abreast of new developments in the debate on 
emissions trading accounting.
Large corporate emitters in the EU ETS and auditors both 
have the potential to effect positive change in how 
accounting for emission allowances is done, but timing is 
crucial. It is the next few years (2010–13) that will be most 
important because of the expected issuance of IASB/FASB 
guidance, and the shift to auctioning of emission 
allowances in the EU ETS.
Accountancy can be a way of making things appear 
uncontroversial and non-political, but the technical 
debates about accountancy rules and standards 
sometimes involve intense power struggles. Increasing 
awareness of the financial bottom-line significance of 
emission allowance accounting – and the current level of 
disparity in corporate reporting – might usefully serve to 
persuade a wider audience of academics (and 
policymakers) that financial accounting is a worthwhile and 
rich area of study.
Recognising that carbon markets have been created by 
governments and other institutions, and that these creations 
can be altered, opens up the possibilities for changing how 
they work, including their financial accounting ‘bedrock’.
We recommend that academic research on carbon 
accounting (financial or otherwise) is continued, as there is 
much to explore, and now is an excellent time to have 
valuable policy input.
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the European Union Emissions Trading System (hereafter, 
EU ETS) are accounting for carbon1 credits. Examining 
accounting approaches in this area is important because 
the financial implications arising from the EU ETS may be 
material in nature and amount. The value of carbon credits 
traded in this market is large: worth US$92 billion/€63 
billion in 2008 (World Bank 2009). In addition, because 
EU ETS is a major mechanism for carbon reductions, the 
way in which we account for its impact will provide 
information from which we may assess the impact of 
climate change policies (especially those concerning 
carbon reductions) on corporations in this market. 
Currently, in the absence of international accounting 
guidance, there is no uniform financial accounting 
treatment for emissions allowances, and previous surveys 
have indicated a diversity of approaches (PwC and IETA 
2007). Our findings suggest that comparable information 
about the relative performance of firms in this market 
cannot be distinguished from carbon-related disclosures, a 
situation that is unsatisfactory for individual corporations 
as well as actual and potential users of financial report 
information.
The research consisted of a survey of financial accounting 
disclosures of the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters 
in the EU ETS (26 companies) as well as follow-up 
telephone interviews with accountants in these companies 
(five interviews were conducted) to explore why particular 
accounting practices have been adopted. The findings of 
the research are twofold. First, there is a significant 
diversity in how companies are accounting for emission 
allowances across the EU ETS (and different approaches 
result in materially different disclosures in the financial 
statements). Second, that companies would welcome 
guidance from standard setters so that fair comparisons 
can be made between organisations, and in order that 
their accounting choices are made simpler.2
Since the withdrawal of the international accounting 
guidance – ‘Interpretation 3: Emission Rights’ (known as 
‘IFRIC-3’) from the International Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee – in 2005, there has been no 
formal accounting recommendation as to how to account 
for EU ETS obligations. Companies, therefore, have a 
degree of choice in how they account for emission 
1.  The term ‘carbon’ is typically used as a shorthand way of referring to 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), of which carbon dioxide is the main one 
produced by human activity. The GHGs incorporated within the EU ETS 
are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, 
hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride. They are measured in terms 
of carbon dioxide equivalence, and hence the shorthand of ‘carbon’ is 
used.
2.  It was expected that the International Accounting Standards Board 
(hereafter IASB) and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(hereafter FASB) were going to issue draft guidance in this area late in 
2010. Unfortunately, the date for this has been set back by over a year, 
with late 2011 now being the date for issuance of draft guidance and 2012 
being the earliest date that a final standard could now be expected. 
Regardless of timing, this research will feed into the work of these, and 
other, standard setters.
allowances, both in defining what kind of asset an emission 
allowance is (intangible asset or inventory) and in how it is 
valued (at cost or fair value) (see ACCA 2009; Deloitte 
2009; Ernst and Young 2010). Further, it is worth noting 
that the choice of asset classification is not necessarily 
linked to valuation or measurement. Two key questions for 
this research were therefore: ‘How are emission allowances 
classified?’ and ‘How are emission allowances measured?’
In summary, the research produced the following findings.
A large proportion of surveyed companies (42%, or 11 •	
of the 26 companies) treat emission allowances as 
intangible assets. This means that the allowances are 
measured in company accounts ‘at cost’. If allowances 
were obtained by the company at no charge they are 
shown, therefore, as having nil value, but if emission 
allowances are purchased they have a cost associated 
with them in the accounts (Ernst and Young 2010).
Of the companies surveyed, 31% (eight companies) are •	
accounting for granted carbon allowances at nil value 
(on the basis that allowances are granted at no charge). 
Only 15% (or four companies) are accounting for 
emission allowances initially at fair value, with the 
difference between fair value and cost recognised as a 
governmental grant and presented as deferred income 
on the balance sheet.
Most of the companies are measuring their obligation •	
to surrender allowances on a ‘cost with the balance at 
market value’ basis. That is, valuation is based on the 
carrying value of those allowances already granted or 
purchased (as this is at cost, a figure usually close to 
zero), while (if applicable) valuing at the market value 
the allowances that still need to be purchased to cover 
actual emissions (58%, or 15 of the companies).3 
Most of the companies do not disclose any information •	
on amortisation/depreciation (69%, or 18 companies) 
or revaluation of emission allowances (50%, or 13 
companies). 
Information on Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) •	
was not provided by most of the companies (77%, or 
20 companies).
Interviews with accountants confirmed that they find it •	
difficult to account for emission allowances and 
revealed a guidance role for auditors in the absence of 
an international accounting standard. In addition, 
interviews provided evidence that accountants would 
generally welcome the prospect of international 
accounting guidance in this area (with draft guidance 
expected at the time of writing in late 2011). 
3.  This is an accounting practice not permitted under the withdrawn 
IFRIC-3, which recommended that assets (the allowances) should be 
treated independently to the liabilities arising under the EU ETS.
1. introduction
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bACkground
The desire to mitigate the probable manifestations of 
climate change is partly expressed through the 
construction of markets in which carbon credits are 
created and exchanged; carbon credits are defined in 
standard units of GHGs. Differences in the rules and 
practices within these markets can alter their 
environmental and economic impacts and, as a result, 
assessing the effectiveness of these markets is important 
in understanding the effectiveness of mitigation measures 
in general. Moreover, how well markets work depends 
upon information provided by market participants. 
This report does not address the ‘physical’ monitoring and 
reporting by the installations and verifying by EU member 
states of GHG emissions in the context of EU ETS. Rather, 
it focuses on a crucial area of carbon rules and practices 
within the EU ETS – and one that is key to the effectiveness 
of the carbon markets – namely the treatment of European 
Emission Allowances (EUAs,4 henceforth referred to as 
‘emission allowances’5) in financial statements. Since the 
withdrawal of the international accounting guidance (IFRIC 
3) in 2005, there has been no formal accounting 
recommendation as to how to account for EU ETS 
obligations, and a diversity of practices has emerged as a 
result (see PwC and IETA 2007). 
In 2008, the Emissions Trading Schemes project was 
re-launched by the IASB, this time in conjunction with its 
US counterpart, the FASB. The remit of the IASB/FASB 
project includes providing guidance on accounting for 
tradable emissions rights and obligations arising under 
emissions trading schemes, as well as the accounting of 
activities undertaken in contemplation of receiving 
tradable rights in future periods. Recommendations likely 
to emerge from this process will have the greatest impact 
on companies in Europe because of the existence and size 
of the EU ETS. For this reason, our study focuses on 
current disclosure practices of firms that are already 
subject to the EU ETS. Further, as more carbon markets 
emerge in the near future (as well as the prospect of 
globalised carbon markets), the way in which carbon is 
accounted for in the EU ETS will have increasing 
international relevance. 
It is necessary to provide information about the impact of 
carbon markets in the financial statements of companies 
for the effective operation of capital markets. In contrast 
with other issues in carbon markets where there has been 
4.  A EUA equates to one tonne of CO2 (either in the form of CO2 or a CO2 
equivalent measure of GHGs).
5.  Note that there is some overlap between the terms ‘emission 
allowance’ and ‘carbon credit’. Carbon credit is a more general term that 
covers either a reduction in emissions, or an offset. For simplicity in this 
report we use the term ‘emission allowance’, as emission allowances (GHG 
reductions, not offsets) represent the large majority of transactions in the 
EU ETS. Nonetheless, where appropriate we also use the more general 
term ‘carbon credit’.
both government involvement and extensive public debate, 
such as voluntary offsetting (Kollmuss et al. 2008; Lovell et 
al. 2009), choices that affect financial accounting 
disclosures appear to be taking place among a much 
smaller group of experts. As a result, one of the objectives 
of this project is to open up the debate about how to 
account for emissions allowances to involve a wider 
audience. It is why this work has been supported by a 
partnership between the International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA) and ACCA. The IASB/FASB Emissions 
Trading Schemes project is due to publish its Draft 
Exposure in late 2011, which means that the research is 
also timely.
Aims
The project had five aims.
1. To survey the treatment of carbon emission allowances 
within the financial statements of large EU ETS emitters 
in order to establish a baseline understanding of 
current accounting practices.
2. To assess awareness and knowledge of the IASB/FASB 
Emissions Trading Schemes project, and to evaluate its 
probable effect on current and future choices of 
financial accounting approach. 
3. To establish an understanding of opinions on how to 
resolve the absence of accounting guidance for 
emission allowances.
4. To explore the theoretical implications of the research 
findings. 
5. To disseminate the research findings to a range of 
policy and academic audiences in order to illuminate 
the political and institutional challenges and 
opportunities that exist for governing the financial 
accounting treatment and reporting of emission 
allowances.
Besides a practical and policy need for the research (for 
example, because of the lack of comprehensive up-to-date 
information about financial accounting practices of firms 
in the EU ETS), there are also important conceptual 
aspects to address. Rules and practices are still ‘hot’ or 
unsettled (Lohmann 2009) and, hence, this setting 
provides an opportunity to explore the process by which 
new accounting principles and practices come into being. 
Several theoretical frameworks could be used to 
understand what is going on, including: theories of 
accounting and society, theories of measurement and 
calculation, and economic sociology approaches. Concepts 
and ideas from these three broad areas of literature are 
used as lenses to explore the political and institutional 
challenges of governing the financial reporting of 
emissions allowances and to assess whether there is 
anything particularly new or different about the treatment 
of carbon in financial statements (see Chapter 3). These 
three literatures have been chosen because they are 
judged to be most relevant and to provide the best insights 
10
into the issues that are emerging in emission allowance 
accounting. Chapter 3 has been purposefully designed as a 
stand-alone chapter, and readers from a non-academic 
background may wish to skip or skim-read this chapter.
meThod
A two-stage approach to surveying the accounting choices 
of corporate players in the EU ETS has been adopted: a 
survey of financial statement disclosures, and a series of 
telephone interviews.
stage one: survey of financial statements 
A desk-based review and analysis of the 2008 financial 
statements of the largest emitters within the EU ETS was 
conducted in order to establish their accounting treatment 
of carbon emissions (2008 was the most recent year for 
which verified emissions data were available). The choice of 
the companies surveyed was dictated by a desire to 
capture disclosure data for at least 25% of all EU ETS 
carbon emissions. This 25% cut-off point ensured that we 
included in our survey the emission allowance accounting 
practices of the main polluters, for whom emissions are 
most likely to be material to their accounts. The European 
Commission’s Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL) was used to identify installations (that is, individual 
factories/power stations) that emitted the largest amount 
of carbon. Given that the CITL provides only details of 
installations, and not company data, a matching of 
installations to organisations was undertaken. Therefore, 
68 installations were selected from the CITL, which equate 
to those responsible for approximately 26% of the EU ETS 
total verified emissions in 2008. The companies owning 
the installations were then identified by Internet searches, 
revealing that 26 organisations collectively owned these 68 
installations (the companies surveyed are listed in Table 1.1).
Analysis of the accounting disclosures made in the 
financial statements of these 26 companies was guided, 
with some modifications, by the questions (see Appendix) 
used for the EU ETS survey undertaken by IETA and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC and IETA 2007). In 
conducting the survey, particular attention was paid to the 
‘Notes to the financial statements’, which detailed the 
accounting policy followed and in some cases also 
provided a justification for the accounting choices made.
Table 1.1: eu eTs companies’ financial reports surveyed 
Company name EU ETS sector(s)
Acelormittal Combustion; Iron and Steel
BEH Other
British Energy Combustion
CEZ Combustion
Drax Combustion
East Energia Combustion
EDF Combustion
EDP Combustion
Edson Combustion
Endesa Combustion
Enel Combustion
EON Combustion
Essent Combustion
Grosskraftwerk Combustion
Iberdrola Combustion
Nuon Combustion
PPC Combustion
PGE Combustion
Ruukki Iron and Steel
RWE Combustion
Saras Refining
Shell Refining
Tata Steel Coke ovens; Iron and Steel
Tauron Combustion
Thyssenkrupp Iron and Steel
US Steel Košice sro Iron and Steel
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To support stage one of the survey, a literature review and 
documentary analysis was undertaken to provide a brief 
history and overview of accounting standard-setting for 
emissions trading (see Chapter 2). A review of the relevant 
academic literature in this area has also been conducted 
(see Chapter 3).
Some issues arose as stage one of the research 
progressed, particularly the following. 
A small number of installations initially selected from •	
the CITL list could not be linked to financial statements, 
either because the annual report could not be found or 
because it was in a language not spoken by the 
research team. To resolve this issue, the next 
installation from the CITL list was selected to ensure 
that the 25% target of EU ETS emissions for the survey 
sample was obtained.
We initially planned to use Carbon Disclosure Project •	
(CDP) reports as a point of comparison with the 
financial statements. We found, however, that the CDP 
reports had less detailed information than financial 
reports and permission to use CDP data could only be 
obtained if this ACCA–IETA report would not be sold at 
some future date – a matter that, as researchers, we did 
not control.
We experienced some difficulties in categorising the •	
accounting treatment of emission allowances. For 
example, in our initial analysis a large number of 
accounting practices were grouped as ‘other’ (using the 
PWC–IETA template – see Appendix). This problem was 
resolved by undertaking more detailed analysis of 
accounting practices, but in some cases we still 
struggled to create a categorisation that could cope 
with the diversity of accounting practices.
A small number of companies in our sample (four) •	
disclosed no information on emission allowance 
accounting in their financial statements. This was 
unexpected, given the anticipated significance of their 
exposure to the EU ETS. Because these organisations 
are large multinational companies it may be, however, 
that emission allowances are not material to their 
accounts. This is an issue we were unable to clarify 
because of the absence of any information about the 
financial ramifications of their EU ETS position. We 
emailed these four companies directly to request 
information about their accounting treatment of 
emission allowances. This approach yielded 
information from one company.
stage two: telephone interviews
The second stage of the work built upon the first, and 
consisted of a series of telephone interviews. 
Representatives from all 26 companies surveyed in stage 
one of the research were invited for a short follow-up 
telephone interview (of 15 to 30 minutes’ duration) to 
explore in more detail why they had adopted the 
accounting practices they used; from where they sought 
and obtained advice and information in this area; their 
opinions on possible future changes to EU ETS accounting; 
and the role of accounting standard setters in this context. 
Initial requests were sent to their investor relations 
department, or they were contacted via IETA: these 
preliminary contacts were followed up (as necessary) by a 
telephone call and/or a further email. The questions were 
emailed to interviewees in advance of the interview and the 
same questions were asked in all interviews. It was hoped 
that a minimum of ten companies would agree to 
participate in a telephone interview, but only five interviews 
(19% of companies) were secured. The main reason given 
(by six companies) for refusing to participate in the survey 
was because of concerns about commercial confidentiality. 
This suggests that the accounting treatment of emission 
allowances and their impact on corporations is significant.
The interviews that were conducted were digitally recorded 
(with each interviewee’s permission) and transcribed. 
Coding of transcripts was undertaken using the qualitative 
software package ‘Atlas’ and an inductive approach to 
coding. 
This introductory chapter has discussed the rationale for 
the research, its aims and the methods used. In the next 
chapter we provide some more detailed background to the 
study, including an overview of the EU ETS and a summary 
of how international accounting standard setters have thus 
far sought to deal with emission allowances.
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In this chapter the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) is introduced, and the accounting 
treatments for emission allowances proposed by standard 
setters are discussed. The chapter seeks to provide an 
outline of the policy and political context of the study, 
covering issues such as the launch and subsequent 
withdrawal of IFRIC 3 (emission allowance accounting 
guidance) in 2005, differences in emission allowance 
accounting between Europe and the United States, and an 
update on the IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes 
project. Through this necessarily partial overview of the 
history of accounting standard setting for emissions 
trading, it is hoped that a flavour is conveyed of the 
technical complexity and ambiguity of the treatment of 
emissions allowances in financial accounting, and of the 
fact that to date standard setting in this area has been a 
messy and uncertain process.
The europeAn union emission TrAding sysTem 
(eu eTs)
The EU ETS has been operational since January 2005, and 
is the largest multi-country, multi-sector GHG emission 
trading system worldwide. It represents a major plank of 
the EU’s emission reduction target (which is for a 20% 
reduction from 1990 levels by 2020). The scheme requires 
each member state to set a cap on emissions, and 
allowances (termed EUAs) are then allocated (and, if 
appropriate, subsequently traded) up to the amount of 
allowances issued. Thus far, the large majority of emission 
allowances (c.95%) have been granted to companies free 
of charge by governments. Installations are covered by the 
EU ETS if they are deemed to be ‘major emitters’ and 
these include combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, 
iron and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, 
lime, brick, ceramics, pulp and paper. Currently, over 
11,500 installations across Europe are governed by the EU 
ETS and collectively they represent approximately 50% of 
Europe’s emissions of carbon dioxide (and 40% of 
Europe’s total GHG emissions).
The EU ETS has been split into three compliance periods:
Phase 1 (which ran from 2005–7 and which was •	
purposely designed as a learning phase)
Phase 2 (which runs from 2008–12 and which is •	
currently in place), and
Phase 3 (which will run from 2013–20).•	
Installations must surrender (by 30 April of each year) 
allowances equal to their emissions during the previous 
calendar year. In Phase 2 there is a penalty of €100 for 
every tonne of emissions that does not have matching 
allowances.
To date, most emission allowances (approximately 95%) 
have been allocated to installations free of charge. This has 
had an effect on accounting practices, with allowances 
typically being shown in accounts at nil value (on the basis 
of their cost). In Phase 3 of the scheme, however, a shift to 
more auctioning of allowances is planned (under EC 
Directive 2009/29/EC) with 70% of allowances being 
auctioned by 2020 (and at least 50% from 2013). This will 
have a knock-on effect on accounting practices (a point 
returned to in Chapter 5). 
The auctioning of allowances will be organised and carried 
out individually by EU member states, and the amount 
auctioned will vary from sector to sector. For instance, 
electricity generators will have full auctioning from 2013 
(albeit with some scope to opt out). In other all industry 
sectors auctioning will be phased in more gradually: 
starting at 20% in 2013 and increasing to 70% by 2020 
(Europa 2008; EC Directive 2009/29/EC 2009). 
The EU allows credits from the United Nations Kyoto 
Protocol ‘Flexible Mechanisms’ (that is, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 
(JI)) to be used by companies to meet EU ETS compliance 
targets, albeit that an upper limit for the use of these 
credits has been set. The European Commission has ruled 
that Kyoto credits can form a maximum of 50% of EU-wide 
emission reductions in the period 2008–20 (equal to 
about 1.6 billion credits). For existing installation operators 
this means that in Phase 2 (the current phase) a maximum 
of about 11% of allowances surrendered can be covered by 
Kyoto credits (Europa 2008).
Emission allowances are sold and purchased for different 
reasons, including the  need to have, at the surrendering 
date, the number of allowances that match the actual 
emissions of an installation; allowances can also be assets 
held for trading. The EU ETS, therefore, has generated a 
market for emission allowances. Prices of EUAs have been 
volatile in the period between 2008 and 2010. For 
example, in July 2008 an EUA was priced at €28 euros on 
the spot market, yet by February 2009 this price had fallen 
to €8 euros. The current trading band for EUAs (in May 
2010) is at about €10–€15.
The fall in EUA prices in early 2009 can be linked to the 
recession, with a number of emission allowances being 
sold because of declining industrial output (and therefore 
reduced GHG emissions). In addition, as could be 
expected, companies were short of cash at this time and 
looking for additional funds. Indeed, there is evidence that 
allowances were sold to provide short-term funds (Capoor 
and Ambrossi 2009). The ability for EUAs to provide a 
source of funds was also facilitated by the process by 
which allowances are allocated each year. Specifically, 
while installations must surrender their allowances by the 
2. emissions trading and financial accounting 
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end of April the year after the compliance period, they are 
issued with allowances in February of the calendar year 
corresponding to the compliance period. This means that 
even if a company sold 2008 allowances to raise cash, it 
could still use its 2009 allowances (issued in February 
2009) if it had a shortfall of allowances at April 2009. 
Clearly EUAs are an asset to an organisation and are used 
to offset emissions as well as having a financial use (in this 
example, through the regulation of cash flows).
Table 2.1: The materiality of emission allowances to eu eTs companies
Company name Currency/units
 Assets emission 
allowances (I)  Assets total (II) % (I/II)
 Liabilities 
emission 
allowances (III) 
 Liabilities total 
(IV) % (III/IV)
BEH
000s BGN 
(Bulgarian Levs)     38,585  3,488,399 1.11%
CEZ
000,000s CZK 
(Czech koruna)  1,523  473,175 0.32%  1,033  287,765 0.36%
Drax
000,000s 
pounds  26  2,107 1.25%  158  1,414 11.20%
East Energia 000s  euros     9,074  638,089 1.42%
EDF 000,000s euros  552  200,288 0.28%  397  175,446 0.23%
EDP 000s euros  385,096 35,709,095 1.08%  496,425  27,162,186 1.83%
Edson 000,000s euros  15  15,093 0.10%    
Endesa 000,000s euros  568  58,546 0.97%  518  37,782 1.37%
Enel 000,000s euros    10 106,912 0.01%
EON 000,000s euros 1,094 71,763 1.52%    
Essent 000,000s euros  450  12,991 3.46%  20  7,738 0.26%
Grosskraftwerk 000s euros  19,040  574,496 3.31%  19  460,354 0.004%
IBERDROLA 000s euros  520,821 85,837,029 0.61%  484,042  59,331,301 0.82%
PCC 000s euros     108,073  8,972,857 1.20%
PGE
000s PLN (Polish 
zloty)  9,931 47,192,261 0.02%  391,271  17,016,683 2.30%
RWE 000,000s euros  1,216  93,430 1.30%  1,396  80,290 1.74%
Saras 000s euros  83,175  3,236,258 2.57%  5,135  1,925,205 0.27%
US Steel Košice, 
s.r.o. 000 euros  165,794  2,134,112 7.77%  137,633  953,166 14.44%
Average    1.75%   2.41%
In addition, the value of emission allowances may be large 
(and at times material in accounting terms) where the 
company is a large emitter. For example, in 2008 the 
Endesa Group (an electricity generation and supply 
company) had to surrender allowances to cover 30 million 
tonnes of emissions, which were valued at €518 million 
(representing 1.37% of total liabilities).6 Table 2.1 gives 
further examples of the materiality of emission allowances 
to EU ETS companies.7 
6.  See page 43 of Endesa’s 2008 Consolidated Financial Statement.
7.  Note that Table 2.1 contains information for 18 of the total 26 
companies surveyed. This is because 10 companies did not disclose 
sufficient information on their assets and liabilities to allow comparisons.
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At present, the accounting treatment for allowances as 
assets and liabilities varies significantly between 
companies, because different types of accounting 
classification and measurement can be used (see Chapter 
4), thus making direct comparison between companies 
difficult. The aim of Table 2.1 is to illustrate how emission 
allowances may, in general terms, affect financial 
statements. The table contains information on emission 
allowances classified as Assets and Liabilities on 31 
December 2008 (with the exception of East Energia, whose 
year end is 31 March 2008). The materiality percentages 
shown in Table 2.1 are likely to be an underestimate of 
actual materiality (typically considered to be in the order 
to 5–10% of total net assets/liabilities, but with significant 
variation according to professional judgement on a case-
by-case basis). This is because Table 2.1 expresses 
materiality as a percentage of carbon allowances over total 
assets. In fact, most assets in these companies have 
life-cycles of 40 years, and yet carbon has a lifecycle of 
only one year. An alternative method of calculation (which 
may bear a closer fit with the true value and materiality of 
carbon assets to a company, revealing them to be much 
higher) would be to calculate the value of carbon as a 
percentage of operating profit. So, although the materiality 
percentages in Table 2.1 seem small, we have used a 
conservative methodology, which is likely to have 
underestimated their significance. Further, if there are 
some companies in a sector that disclose substantial 
carbon assets and liabilities, while other similar companies 
disclose nothing, then this diversity is material, because it 
is misleading to the users of the reports. This so-called 
‘issue materiality’ is evident from our findings. 
ACCounTing for emission AllowAnCes
According to IASB rules, in cases where no accounting 
standards apply, paragraph 10 of IAS 8 Accounting 
Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors should 
be followed. This requires that management should use its 
judgement in developing and applying an accounting 
policy that results in information that is relevant and 
reliable, in consultation with the firm’s auditors. The result 
of this would be that the issues involved in accounting for 
emission allowances would be governed by a number of 
existing international financial accounting standards, 
including: International Accounting Standard (IAS) 2 
Inventories; IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and 
Disclosure of Government Assistance; IAS 37 Provisions, 
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets; IAS 38 
Intangible Assets; and IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement. The array of potentially 
relevant standards arises owing to the multiple sources of, 
and uses for, emission allowances. Allowances may be 
directly linked to operational concerns (that is, they may 
be held in order to comply with the EU ETS rules) as well 
as for trading purposes (that is, they are bought and sold 
at different prices in order to generate profits). 
The various possible uses of allowances leads to ambiguity 
about what sort of ‘thing’ an emission allowance is in 
accounting terms: is it a commodity or a financial 
instrument? Should it be recognised as an asset even if it 
is acquired at zero cost? Such questions pervade technical 
discussions by standard setters and accounting 
practitioners (see, for example, IASB 2009). Moreover, 
because financial accounting guidance for emissions is still 
in a state of flux, uncertainty has flourished since the start 
of the EU ETS in 2005. 
An especially tricky issue for accounting standard setters 
is that although individuals and organisations legitimately 
use carbon credits (including emissions allowances) in 
different ways (for example, to comply with regulation, to 
offset their emissions voluntarily and to trade on the 
market) allowances are not linked to any specific use. So, 
for example, a company operating under the EU ETS could 
initially attribute an emission allowance to production (and 
thus follow one set of accounting practices), but then 
subsequently change policy and trade it with the aim of 
regulating cash-flow. This combination of the potential of 
emission allowances for multiple use and their 
interchangeability makes it challenging to issue one set of 
guidance under a single international accounting standard. 
The difficulty for management in knowing exactly why 
allowances are held at any one time helps to explain the 
emergence of an ‘activity-based’ model of accounting 
(which appears to have been adopted by accountants 
since the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 – see Chapter 4). Indeed, in 
its comprehensive guidance in this area the accounting 
firm KPMG suggests a type of activity-based model (KPMG 
2008), which recommends that accountants follow 
different accounting principles depending on the type of 
organisation they are accounting for, and hence the type of 
activity that is being undertaken. KPMG’s classification 
(2008) of organisations according to their dominant 
activity includes: emitters, creators of green energy, 
traders/aggregators, and investors/consultants. 
The IASB, in contrast, is not predisposed to favour an 
‘activity-based’ approach to accounting for emission 
allowances as it does not sit easily with its own principles-
based approach to standard setting (see discussion 
below). The rationale is that, even though emission 
allowances are used in different ways, this should not 
affect the accounting treatment because the allowances 
are all EUAs/CERs. In other words, the IASB view is that 
even if emission allowances are assigned temporally by 
users to a particular purpose, their use can potentially 
change at any moment and, consequently, they should be 
treated by accountants consistently in a single, uniform 
way. 
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The ifriC 3 debACle
Steps are currently being taken, principally by the IASB 
and the FASB, to attempt to resolve the uncertainty 
surrounding the accounting of emission allowances. The 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the history of IASB 
and FASB guidance on emissions trading and the current 
status of the IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes 
project (relaunched in 2008). 
In the run up to the advent of the EU ETS, accounting 
guidance was issued by the IASB via its International 
Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC): 
IFRIC Interpretation 3: Emission Rights (known as ‘IFRIC 3’) 
was published in December 2004. IFRIC 3 recommended 
that assets (specifically EUAs) should be treated 
independently from liabilities arising under the EU ETS. 
Accordingly, the measurement of liabilities on the basis of 
the carrying value of allowances (assets) in this area was 
not permitted. More specifically, IFRIC 3 gave guidance to 
the effect that EUAs should be treated as intangible assets 
(regardless of whether they have been allocated free of 
charge or purchased) and therefore fall under the 
accounting treatment and disclosure remit of IAS 38. 
Further, allowances that are allocated for less than fair 
value (recalling that EUAs have historically been allocated 
free of charge, although this is set to change in Phase 3 of 
the EU ETS) should be measured initially at their fair value 
(that is, at market price), and the difference between the 
amount paid and fair value should be identified as a 
government grant and therefore accounted for under IAS 
20 (Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of 
Government Assistance). This ‘grant’ should initially be 
classified as deferred income in the balance sheet, and 
subsequently recognised as income over the compliance 
period. 
In terms of assessing and accounting for liabilities, IFRIC 3 
judged that a liability to provide EUAs should be 
recognised in the accounts as the emissions are made, 
and that this obligation should be treated as a ‘provision’ 
and hence covered by IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets). The liability should again 
be measured at fair value (that is, the best estimate of the 
expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the 
balance sheet date).
The amount of controversy that IFRIC 3’s 
recommendations generated was striking and led to its 
eventual withdrawal. There was negative reaction from EU 
ETS participants, especially by utilities and large industry 
emitters. The European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG) issued a particularly negative endorsement 
advice, which carried considerable weight (Bebbington 
and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2008). The main objections 
included one against the IFRIC 3 recommendation that 
gains and losses derived from the valuation of liabilities be 
reported in the Income Statement, while the gains and 
losses derived from any revaluation of the emission 
allowances were recognised under Equity in the balance 
sheet (this is what is known as a ‘mixed presentation 
model’). Additionally, the nature of different assets, some 
measured on recognition at cost and others at fair value 
(known as a ‘mixed measurement model’) also caused 
concerns (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2008; 
Cook 2009; MacKenzie 2009). These mismatches led 
EFRAG to consider that the IFRIC 3 recommendations 
would lead to artificial volatility in company results, 
considering that only a small amount of the total emissions 
rights contained within the EU ETS is purchased. Given the 
negative endorsement advice from EFRAG, as well as the 
views of the European Commission, the IASB withdrew 
IFRIC 3 in June 2005.
In the period since then there has been no international 
guidance on how to account for emission allowances and a 
diversity of practices has emerged (PwC and IETA 2007; 
McGready 2008; Cook 2009; MacKenzie 2009). As 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the majority of EU ETS 
companies have been practising a ‘cost with balance at 
market value’ approach (which IFRIC 3 specifically 
prohibited) where allowances are measured at nil value 
(because they are acquired for no charge), and the liability 
to surrender allowances is similarly measured at nil value 
(again, because the allowances do not cost the company 
anything), with any shortfall or excess in allowances being 
valued at market price. 
Having noted a lack of international accounting regulation 
in this area it is relevant to acknowledge that some 
European countries have issued guidance through national 
accounting regulations. For instance, in Spain regulation 
requires a broadly IFRIC 3 approach. The point where 
IFRIC 3 and the Spanish approach depart from each other 
is with respect to accounting for provisions: in Spain 
provisions are not valued at fair value but at the carrying 
value of the allowances (an approach taken in order to 
avoid volatility).
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differenCes beTween europe And The uniTed 
sTATes
Accounting for emission allowances has followed different 
trajectories in Europe and the United States (US). Indeed, 
approaches to emissions trading schemes differ between 
the two jurisdictions (carbon markets in the US have been 
much slower to emerge than in Europe, and there is 
nothing yet comparable in size and scope to the EU ETS). 
The distinction between Europe and the US is relevant 
because the accounting standard setters’ Emissions 
Trading Schemes project involves a collaboration between 
the IASB and the FASB. As a result, views from the US will 
affect the content of the Emissions Trading Schemes 
Exposure Draft when it ultimately emerges in the second 
half of 2011.
In the US, the sulphur dioxide emissions trading scheme 
(which commenced in 1995) led to the need for US 
accounting guidance (Johnston et al. 2008; MacKenzie 
2009). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
has been the most influential organisation in determining 
the accounting treatment in this area because utilities have 
been most directly affected by sulphur dioxide regulation, 
and FERC is the organisation that directly regulates energy 
utilities in the US – its remit includes surveillance of their 
accounting practices (Deloitte 2007). Indeed, FERC is the 
only US organisation to date that has issued any emission 
allowance accounting guidance: there is no accounting 
standard or interpretation on accounting for GHG 
emissions within US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (US GAAP) (Ernst and Young 2010). Moreover, 
there is no distinction between accounting for different 
types of emission allowances in the US (whether they be 
sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides or carbon dioxide): the 
accounting rules (such as exist) are the same for all types 
of emissions.
The recommendation in the FERC Uniform System of 
Accounts is that emission allowances should be classified 
as inventory, measured on a historical cost basis (that is, 
they should be valued at their original cost, in most cases 
zero), with recognition of costs as emissions are made 
(that is, as the allowances are ‘consumed’) on a weighted-
average cost basis (Deloitte 2007). Although FASB claims 
that most companies in the US are accounting for 
emission allowances as inventory, research by Ernst and 
Young has shown a more mixed approach, with many 
companies recognising them as intangible assets (Ernst 
and Young 2010). US companies, such as utilities that 
require emission allowances for compliance (and hence 
see them as an essential part of the production process), 
tend to follow the inventory accounting model, whereas 
companies that have more varied business activities (for 
example, producing credits from projects in developing 
countries, trading credits) tend to follow the intangible 
asset model (Deloitte 2007). Under both the inventory and 
intangible assets accounting models, the company does 
not typically recognise an obligation to deliver emission 
allowances to the regulator until the actual level of 
emissions for the year exceeds the number of allowances 
on the balance sheet (Ernst and Young 2010). This 
procedure is therefore similar to the EU ETS company 
approach of valuing at cost, with the balance measured at 
market price. In practice, this means that only the shortfall 
in allowances is disclosed in the financial statements.
It was not until late 2003 that the FASB Emerging Issues 
Task Force (EITF) attempted to address the question of 
accounting for emission allowances (in Issue No. 03–14, 
titled ‘Participants’ Accounting for Emissions Allowances 
under a ‘Cap and Trade’ Program’) (FASB 2010). The 
proposal, however, was not taken forward because of 
concerns that the accounting recommendations might 
have implications beyond cap and trade schemes (for 
example, for the accounting of government licences and 
permits) and because some EITF members did not 
perceive that there was any diversity in emission allowance 
accounting practice (Deloitte 2007). 
The accounting of emission allowances did not, however, 
totally disappear from the FASB agenda. In late 2004, 
FASB Statement No. 153 Exchanges of Nonmonetary Assets 
raised questions about whether ‘vintage year’ emission 
allowance swaps should be accounted for at fair value or 
on the basis of the recorded amount. ‘Vintage year’ 
emission allowance swaps are the trades between 
companies of similar emission allowances. In a typical US 
cap and trade carbon market, each individual emission 
allowance has an assigned vintage year, indicating the first 
year in which that allowance may be used. Allowances with 
the same vintage year designation can be traded or 
swapped. Vintage-year swaps among companies are 
common, because government agencies typically issue 
allowances for multiple years at a time. So the issue for 
FASB was whether or not vintage-year swaps should be 
accounted for at fair value, in keeping with FASB 
Statement No. 153 Exchanges of Nonmonetary Assets, 
where assets classified as inventory would generally be 
measured at fair value if exchanged. In 2006, the FASB 
Technical Application and Implementation Activities 
Committee approved a recommendation for the FASB 
Board to add a project to its agenda to address the nature 
of emission allowances and clarify the accounting method 
in relation to vintage-year swaps. The external reviewing 
process conducted by FASB revealed a strong opinion 
among industry and accounting firms that the issue of 
vintage-year swaps touched on wider issues about 
emissions trading accounting, which itself indicated a need 
for a more holistic and systematic review. This external 
feedback eventually led to the establishment of the joint 
IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes project in 2008.
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The 2008 iAsb/fAsb emissions TrAding sChemes 
projeCT
The joint IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes project 
aims to resolve accounting uncertainty by issuing clear 
guidance. Originally scheduled to publish an Exposure 
Draft in late 2009 and then in late 2010, the project has 
now been further delayed and the Exposure Draft is 
expected in the second half of 2011, with the aim of 
publishing an International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) by the end of 2012 (IASB 2010). 
The IASB/FASB project has a broader remit than the 
former IASB project. In particular, the project covers not 
just the EU ETS but seeks to produce a standard that 
would be suitable for accounting of all tradable emissions 
rights and obligations arising under any existing or 
proposed Emissions Trading Schemes worldwide, thereby 
anticipating that there will be a growth of emissions 
trading schemes across the globe.
To date, IASB and FASB have made relatively modest 
progress in reaching decisions on emissions trading. For 
example, the IASB Board decided in March 2009 that 
emission allowances are assets (even if received free of 
charge from government) and that they should therefore 
be measured initially at fair value (resolving the so-called 
‘Day One recognition problem’). In contrast, FASB has not 
yet reached agreement on the issue of initial recognition 
and asset status, suggesting that it will or does have some 
difficulty with the IASB position. According to one source, 
the reason why FASB has yet to reach a decision on the 
issue of ‘Day 1 recognition’ appears to be that the FASB 
Board’s preference is to look at accounting for emissions 
in its entirety (that is, to view emissions trading schemes in 
a more holistic manner). In this context, it could be argued 
that emission allowances are not really a ‘gain’ to income 
because the company has to return them at the end of the 
year. In essence, FASB is hesitant to recognise in financial 
statements that a gain has been made on receipt of an 
allowance, where that allowance is given out at no charge. 
Moreover, there are also concerns about the political 
implications of adopting such an accounting treatment, in 
light of criticism of corporate profit-making from Emissions 
Trading Schemes (Lohmann 2006; Harvey and Fidler 
2007).
This difference in approach between IASB and FASB also 
owes much to the more fundamental divide in their 
organisational cultures and practices. Key to this is the 
‘principles-based’ method of standard-setting favoured by 
the IASB (a preference for following a set of overarching 
guidelines in order to evaluate each specific accounting 
case) compared with the more ‘rules-based’ approach 
favoured by the FASB (where new rules might be 
developed for each specific accounting case depending on 
its individual characteristics, which may or may not fit with 
other rules or overarching guidance; a preference for an 
‘activity-based’ accounting model, as discussed above). 
While this tension is by no means exclusive to the 
Emissions Trading Schemes project, it does appear to be 
hampering decision making in this specific context.
summAry
In this chapter, the EU ETS has been introduced, and the 
issues arising in setting accounting standards for emission 
allowances in Europe and the US outlined. It is evident that 
there is a shortage of specific accounting guidance for 
emission allowances. Efforts have been made to address 
the situation but, thus far, mostly in a rather haphazard 
and piecemeal way: at least until we see the final outcome 
of the joint IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes project 
in late 2012. In the next chapter, we take a step back from 
these intricate financial accounting issues to consider 
relevant academic theories that give insights to the issue 
of emission allowance accounting.
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Conceptualising accounting for emission allowances 
potentially cuts across a number of different theories and 
bodies of research. There are a range of relevant literatures 
to draw upon which offer useful insights into how and why 
accountants might be accounting for emission allowances. 
In this chapter concepts and ideas from three broad areas 
of literature (namely theories of accounting and society, 
theories of measurement and calculation, and theories about 
hybrid markets) are used first as lenses to introduce and 
examine the political and institutional challenges of governing 
the financial reporting of carbon, and secondly to assess 
whether there is anything particularly novel or different 
about the treatment of carbon in financial statements. 
The review undertaken here is necessarily brief: it is not 
the authors’ intention to provide a full summary of the 
literature, but rather to consider how this material might 
provide insights into accounting for emission allowances in 
the EU ETS. 
Theories of ACCounTing And soCieTy
Scholars examining the relationship between accounting 
and society argue that accounting is not only relevant 
within the boundaries of a particular firm but plays a 
constitutive role in social processes more generally 
(Hopwood and Miller 1994). This proposition suggests that 
we should be interested in how the accounting profession 
is responding to increasing societal concerns about 
climate change as well as the role that accounting plays in 
shaping and influencing how we make sense of, and deal 
with, climate change. As Miller (1994) suggests, 
‘accounting could not and should not be studied as an 
organizational practice in isolation from the wider social 
and institutional context in which it operates’. In other 
words, social processes shape, and are shaped by, 
accounting. As this rationale equally applies to the issue of 
accounting and climate change (for examples of work on 
this theme see: Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2008; 
Cook 2009; Lohmann 2009; MacKenzie 2009), then this 
current report builds on and further develops this existing 
research, particularly in relation to strengthening its 
empirical base. 
An approach to understanding the financial accounting of 
carbon that takes heed of ideas from the accounting and 
society literature would position accounting as closely 
connected to wider societal debates about not just the 
environment, but also (for example) the relationship 
between markets and governments and the role of science. 
Further, it would view accounting as having the capacity to 
shape society itself, as Miller (1994) explains:
accounting is, above all, an attempt to intervene, to act 
upon individuals, entities and processes to transform 
them and to achieve specific ends. From such a 
perspective, accounting is no longer to be regarded as a 
neutral device that merely documents and reports ‘the 
facts’ of economic activity. Accounting can now be seen 
as a set of practices that affects the type of world we live 
in, the type of social reality we inhabit, the way in which 
we understand choices.
In theory, accounting (according to professional codes of 
conduct) is supposed to reflect ‘economic reality’ and 
societal preferences and practices, but can in practice end 
up influencing them (Miller 1994; Power 1999). The 
accounting and society literature is valuable, therefore, as 
a counter to the implicit assumption within the non-
accounting academic literature on climate change policy, 
politics and markets that accounting is rule-based. 
Indeed, scholars have drawn attention to the often subtle 
ways that power is expressed in decisions about detailed, 
technical accounting rules and principles (Miller 1994; 
Miller and O’Leary 1994; Thompson 1994). Accounting 
can be a way of making things appear ‘anti-political’ 
(Barry 2005) and seemingly uncontroversial, but the 
technical debates about accounting principles and 
standards sometimes involve intense power struggles. With 
accounting for emission allowances still in its formative 
stages (and with many critical decisions to be made) close 
attention to current governance processes and decision 
making (standard setting in particular) is likely to yield 
theoretical and policy insights. Further, because 
accounting rules and principles (once decided) will have a 
potentially material influence on company financial 
statements (namely, profit measures, disclosures, assets 
and liabilities), they are likely to be, increasingly, a site of 
conflict. 
Theories of meAsuremenT And CAlCulATion
When a more indirect approach to understanding carbon 
accounting is taken, there are insights to be gained from 
broader political science and science and technology 
studies literature about measurement, classification, 
quantification and commensuration on topics as diverse as 
medicine and atmospheric science (Alonso and Starr 
1984; Espeland and Stevens 1998; Bowker and Leigh Star 
2000) as well as accounting (Robson 1992; MacKenzie 
2006). 
This literature provides an analysis of how diverse 
phenomena are ‘made the same’, examining the role that 
classifications and standards play, who does that work, 
and what happens to cases that do not fit into standard 
categories that have been constructed. For instance, in 
their analysis of health service and race classifications, 
Bowker and Leigh Star (2000) demonstrate how systems 
of measurement are typically paid little attention on a 
day-to-day basis: 
Good, useable systems disappear almost by definition. 
The easier they are to use, the harder they are to see. As 
well, most of the time, the bigger they are, the harder 
they are to see. (Bowker and Leigh Star 2000)
With financial accounting being one such pervasive ‘big 
system’ (a ‘metadevice’, to use the language of MacKenzie 
2009) it provides an interesting case through which to 
examine the distinctiveness of climate change as a 
problem. There is as yet nothing habitual about accounting 
practices in this area, in contrast to much other 
accounting, which is relatively ingrained, ‘black-boxed’ and 
3. Conceptualising accounting for emission allowances
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routine (MacKenzie 2006). As a result, there is an 
opportunity to conduct empirical research in this area 
because of the continuing uncertainty about how to 
measure and account for carbon, and the visibility of the 
systems of measurement and classification that are 
actively under construction. 
One topic from this broader literature that is particularly 
relevant for analysis of accounting for emission allowances 
is analysis of so-called ‘incommensurables’. Bowker and 
Leigh Star (2000), for instance, suggest concentrating 
critical analysis on cases that do not fit in 
(incommensurables) because these phenomena highlight 
unresolved tensions. Emission allowances do not fit neatly 
under any existing accounting standard, and hence are 
hard to classify, thereby making them a type of 
‘incommensurable’. The difficulties presented in 
accounting for emission allowances have their origins in 
the multiple potential uses of allowances: as a commodity, 
a currency, a financial instrument and so on. This situation, 
in turn, has arisen from political decisions to adopt a 
market-based trading mechanism for implementing 
international climate change policy. As Espeland and 
Stevens (1998) explain ‘claims about incommensurables 
are likely to arise at the borderlands between institutions, 
where what counts as an ideal or normal mode of valuing 
is uncertain’; and, further, that ‘commensuration is noticed 
most when it creates relations among things that seem 
fundamentally different’ (Stevens 1998). MacKenzie 
(2009) makes precisely this point with regard to 
accounting for carbon, outlining how markets in rights to 
emit GHGes can only exist if a variety of different things 
are somehow ‘made the same’. He uses the example of 
how the Clean Development Mechanism allows the 
destruction of one tonne of an industrial waste gas, 
trifluoromethane, or HFC-23, in a facility in China to be 
converted into rights to emit up to 11,700 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide in a power or heat generation plant in Europe 
(MacKenzie 2009). The assumptions used to create this 
equivalence can be challenged on a number of levels, and 
we can usefully add to existing scholarship in this area by 
showing how these tensions play out in practice in the 
financial accounting of carbon within the EU ETS. 
Theorising hybrid mArkeTs
The third set of ideas that is relevant for our investigation 
here is about how economic and financial markets are 
created. An interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
markets asserts that markets are not just economic or 
financial entities but comprise a mix of people, technology, 
objects and things. This conception of a market draws 
from economic sociology (White 1981; Fligstein 1996; 
Callon 1998; Barry 2005; Hardie and Mackenzie 2007; 
Pryke 2007; MacKenzie 2008). Pryke (2007), for example, 
assesses the emergence of weather-based financial trading 
instruments since the late 1990s, using what he terms a 
‘cultural economy’ approach to finance. Likewise, Hardie 
and MacKenzie (2007) examine the workings of hedge 
funds, showing how the market for such investments is 
constructed and shaped by a mix of people and 
technologies.
Work in economic sociology is concerned with how 
economic markets are separated from everyday relations 
and made into a recognisable, working mechanism of 
exchange (Callon 1998; Munro and Smith 2008). In this 
context, examining the microstructures of markets for 
carbon focuses attention on the intricate networks of 
people and ‘things’ that constitute the carbon economy, 
thereby explaining why abstract models rarely fit the 
specifics of particular times and places. Economic 
sociology approaches recognise the myriad tensions and 
the hard work that goes into sustaining, for example, global 
carbon markets every minute of every day. These 
approaches also recognise that markets have to be made, 
and that attention as to how particular arrangements of 
people and ‘things’ come into being as markets is 
important (Lovell and Smith 2010). 
One of the core arguments in this literature is that it is a 
mix of people, objects and technologies (what Callon 
(1998) terms ‘agencements’) that determines what a 
market is and how it evolves. Although this might sound 
self-evident, such a framing serves as a useful counter to 
arguments (found in carbon markets and beyond) that 
‘the market’ itself has agency (an ability to act as more 
than the sum of its parts). In reality, the carbon market, 
like other markets, is no more or less than the complex 
network made up of various elements that it comprises. Of 
particular interest in the context of this report are the 
technical accounting rules and procedures that are 
essential to carbon market operation. Moreover, these 
accounting rules and procedures often lie outside the 
typical frame of reference of many key actors in the 
carbon market. 
Perhaps the key aid to understanding what is happening in 
accounting for emission allowances in the EU ETS is Callon 
and Muniesa’s work (2005) on the constitution of markets 
as ‘calculative collective devices’. This work is important 
because it makes the point that calculation is distributed 
widely across the various elements of a market: that is, it is 
not effected through a single price mechanism or even 
through some form of human agency alone. So it is not 
surprising that quantities such as liabilities and assets 
arising from carbon regulatory regimes are hard to pin 
down: they are things that circulate and transform as they 
do so (Buenza et al. 2006), they are practices enacted for 
a range of difference ends (Munro and Smith 2008), and 
indeed they are stories that, as Velthius (2005) shows, 
concern rather more than simply money. Such ideas, 
therefore, draw attention to the importance of 
interrogating in detail the variety of market devices (such 
as financial accounting) that make calculation possible 
(Callon et al. 2007).
Another key insight of the ‘hybrid markets’ literature 
concerns the potential for markets to be actively shaped 
and governed by various actors. For a new market such as 
carbon (a clear example of something created, in this 
instance mostly by public institutions and governments) it 
is important to appreciate the implications of its public 
sector origin. Callon (quoted in Barry and Slater 2005) 
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neatly explains the value of seeing markets as both 
governable and experimental when he suggests: ‘what 
sociology and anthropology could bring to the [markets] 
debate is precisely a recognition of the experimental 
character of markets and market organisation and the 
need to debate the consequences of experimentation. It is 
a collective learning process’.
The value of these ideas about markets for carbon is in 
illuminating the experimental nature of a relatively recently 
constructed environmental market – that for carbon – that 
rests on the commodification of atmospheric gases, and 
its consequent reliance on sound, workable systems of 
measurement and classification, not least financial 
accounting. Further, these ideas about markets open up 
the possibility for change in how carbon financial 
accounting is carried out, not just in terms of new 
accounting standards (policy and governance) but also in 
the possibility of changing accounting technologies, 
developing new accounting working groups and so on.
A concern of Callon’s (see Barry and Slater 2005) 
regarding carbon markets is that the ‘framing’ of the 
carbon market is premature. Market actors (including 
policymakers and politicians) have been trying to establish 
boundaries and rules before really understanding the 
issues at stake, or truly appreciating the novelty of carbon 
as a commodity. As Lohmann (2009) echoes in his 
insightful analysis of differences between carbon and other 
types of commodity (in this case, wheat):
tensions can be expected to arise whenever a novel 
commodity is being created that depends fundamentally 
on the development of new accounting procedures. 
However, the framing of an amalgam carbon commodity 
also faced many entanglements and overflows that were 
unfamiliar to the bulk of 19th- and 20th-century trading 
systems, and that arguably were not susceptible to 
treatment in a straightforward way by any amount or 
degree of regulation. (Lohmann 2009, emphasis added)
Lohmann emphasises here the integral (and, to date, 
rather overlooked) role of accounting as the foundation of 
carbon markets and wider climate change mitigation 
activities. 
summAry
In this brief review of literature, we have highlighted several 
ideas drawn from work in the areas of economic sociology, 
society and accounting, and commensuration that add 
insights to the case of financial accounting in the EU ETS. 
In particular, taken together, this literature suggests the 
following inferences.
There is nothing yet habitual about accounting for •	
emission allowances, in contrast to much existing 
accounting practice, which is relatively ingrained, 
‘black-boxed’ and routine. This makes the study of 
accounting for emission allowances an interesting case 
study on the nature of accounting.
Emission allowances do not fit neatly under any •	
existing accounting standard because there are 
multiple potential uses of the emission allowance (for 
example, as a commodity, a currency and a financial 
instrument). Emission allowances are, hence, hard to 
classify, they are a type of ‘incommensurable’.
Accounting and society are closely linked: accountants •	
are playing a role in influencing how the problem of 
climate change is comprehended and governed 
through the construction of accounting rules and 
principles in this area.
Accounting can sometimes make ‘things’ appear •	
uncontroversial and a-political or even non-political, but 
the technical debates about accounting rules, 
principles and standards involve intense power 
struggles. Given that emission allowances are likely to 
become more financially material over time, such 
power struggles are to be expected, especially because 
the accounting choices will affect the financial 
statements of large corporations.
Recognition that carbon markets have been created by •	
governments and other institutions opens up 
possibilities for changing how they work, including 
alterations in their financial accounting ‘bedrock’.
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This chapter presents results from the research project, 
drawing on the financial statements survey undertaken 
and interviews conducted to shed more light on the 
reasons why certain accounting practices have been 
adopted by EU ETS participants. The chapter is structured 
around four areas: (i) a summary of key findings (ii) a 
description of how assets are accounted for (iii) an 
equivalent review of the accounting treatments adopted for 
liabilities, and (iv) additional insights that can be drawn 
from the interviews.
summAry of key findings
The main finding of this research is that large emitters 
within the EU ETS are using a diversity of accounting 
practices to account for emission allowances. In particular, 
this has the following aspects.
Most of the companies surveyed are not following •	
‘IFRIC 3’, the original international accounting guidance 
issued in 2004 (and subsequently withdrawn in 2005).
A large proportion of the companies (42%, or 11 of the •	
26) recognise emission allowances as intangible assets. 
Of the surveyed companies, 31% (eight companies) •	
initially recognise allowances at nil value on the 
rationale that they are issued at no charge. Only 15% of 
the sample (four companies) are following the IFRIC 3 
draft guidance to recognise emission allowances 
initially at fair value, with the difference between fair 
value and cost of allowances classified as a 
governmental grant (deferred income) on the balance 
sheet.
Most of the companies do not disclose any information •	
on amortisation/depreciation of assets (69%, or 18 
companies), or on revaluation, of emission allowances 
(50%, or 13 companies).
Likewise, the majority of the companies (77%, or 20 •	
companies) do not disclose any information on 
Certified Emission Reductions (‘CERs’ which can be 
used interchangeably with EUAs).8
Companies’ accounting practices for revealing their •	
overall position on emission allowances (as net assets 
or liabilities) vary hugely, with no discernible pattern in 
accounting treatment.
8.  This finding is hard to interpret. It may be that companies have CERs 
and are not making disclosures about them, or they may not be holding 
any such certificates. It is not possible to verify which situation pertains 
here.
Interviews with accountants confirmed that they find it •	
difficult to account for emission allowances, and 
revealed that there is a potential guidance role for 
auditors in the absence of an international accounting 
standard. Moreover, interviews provided evidence that 
accountants would generally welcome the prospect of 
international accounting guidance in this area. 
Table 4.1 summarises these findings.
Table 4.1 summary of survey of eu eTs top emitters’ 
financial reports 
Emission allowance accounting Disclosure summary*
Granted allowances – initial 
recognition
Intangible assets – 42%
No disclosure – 27%
Purchased allowances – initial 
recognition
Intangible assets – 42%
No disclosure – 27%
CERS – initial recognition No disclosure – 77%
Granted allowances – 
measurement on initial 
recognition
Nil value – 31%
No disclosure – 23%
Fair value – 15%
Amortisation/Depreciation of 
emission allowances
No disclosure – 69%
Re-valuation of emission 
allowances
No disclosure – 50%
Measurement of liabilities Cost with balance at market 
value – 58%
No disclosure – 23%
 
*All percentages shown in Table 4.1 are percentages of the total survey 
responses (26 companies) – they are not the percentage results of only 
those companies that are disclosing.
4. survey of accounting practices
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TreATmenT of AsseTs 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide data on the initial recognition 
of emission allowances in the surveyed companies’ 
financial statements. This treatment does not vary 
significantly whether allowances are granted free of charge 
or purchased. Figure 4.1 illustrates that just under half the 
surveyed companies classify granted allowances (that is, 
those distributed by government, in the main for no charge 
in Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS) as intangible assets. 
Non-disclosure in this area was high, however, with almost 
a third (27%) of the surveyed companies not providing any 
information in this area. Figure 4.2 indicates that for 
purchased allowances (either EUAs or CERs) accounting 
practices follow a similar pattern to those for allocated 
allowances: the most frequent categorisation of these 
assets is ‘intangible’. At the same time, there is also a 
significant amount of non-disclosure in this area. The 
‘activity-based’ model category in Figure 4.2 refers to 
three companies in our survey that held allowances for 
more than one reason. For example, each of these 
companies had allowances that were intended to fulfil the 
entity’s own emissions obligations as well as allowances 
that were held for trading purposes. For these companies, 
the accounting treatment adopted depended on the 
purpose for which the allowances were held.
Note that there are some categories in the figures that are 
‘zero’, ie no companies followed this type of accounting 
treatment. These categories were in our original analysis 
template (see Appendix) and have been included (despite 
the lack of adoption) because they are nevertheless judged 
to be valid methods of accounting treatment. If no 
companies are practising them, then this is still a relevant 
finding.
If we compare our survey results with the accounting 
treatment recommended by the withdrawn IFRIC 3 there 
are points of both difference and similarity. The main 
similarity is that companies are recognising emission 
allowances as intangible assets, as recommended by 
IFRIC 3 (and, therefore, one would expect their treatment 
to fall under IAS 38: Intangible Assets). Nonetheless, as 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 clearly show, not all companies are 
adopting this approach. Rather, there is diversity in 
treatment, with many companies having no disclosure 
while others are classifying allowances as inventory, or 
using an alternative accounting practice. 
The follow-up interviews with accountants give good 
insight into the reasons for this diversity. In particular, it is 
viewed as arising from the lack of guidance from 
accounting standard setters since the withdrawal of 
IFRIC 3 in 2005. Indeed, as one interviewee commented 
(when asked why they believed we had found the pattern 
of disclosure we had): 
I think because of the lack of clarity, well there is no real 
guidance for how to record this in the balance sheet and 
P and L [profit and loss]. Because IFRIC 3 was withdrawn 
some time ago…there is the chance to choose your own 
balance sheet item, either under the intangible or 
inventory. (Head of finance, large European energy 
company)
Intangible assets
No disclosure
Other
Inventory
Tangible assets
Debtors
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7
6
2
0
0
Number of companies
figure 4.1: granted allowances – initial recognition 
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figure 4.2: purchased allowances – initial recognition
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Another interviewee explained how choice of accounting 
treatment for assets (again, given the absence of any firm 
guidance) is based on practicalities: that is, they choose 
the method that is the simplest and easiest:
I think from our perspective, especially the point of 
granted allowances, and in this case we are focusing on 
intangible assets...I think it is the easiest way to disclose 
it because IAS 38 [Intangible Assets] is nice to apply.  
(Accounting policy specialist, large European energy 
company)
Figure 4.3 gives further detail on the extent of 
differentiation in financial statements between CERs 
(credits from the Clean Development Mechanism) and 
EUAs (emission allowances obtained from the EU ETS 
itself). The large majority of the companies surveyed 
(77%) either do not make a distinction between these 
types of carbon credit, or do not hold both sorts of 
allowance (identified here as ‘No disclosure’). For the few 
that do provide disclosure on CERs, there is no obvious 
common treatment choice.
Accounting for CERs was explored further in interviews. 
For one interviewee (whose business includes the 
generation of CERs from renewable energy projects in 
developing countries) there was uncertainty about how to 
account for CERs and, in particular, whether or not the 
different uses of CERs in the EU ETS (either for trading or 
compliance) should be reflected in company financial 
statements. This individual stated that:
From our perspective…the CERs issue is important. Or it 
gets more important now, but it hasn’t been of major 
importance in the last one, two or three years, because 
we are just starting the business. So it is rather low in 
volume…so I think from a materiality perspective it wasn’t 
necessary for us to make a lot of disclosure about 
accounting for CERs yet. But it gets more important...and 
we are just discussing with our auditors and with other 
companies about how to account for CERs. When the CER 
business expands then I think we will publish more, how 
we do it and give a sense of volume too…There’s an 
economic difference between the CERs which are used 
for a business purpose and generated and sold [traded], 
and the CERs which might be used for compliance 
reasons…therefore we want to make [a] difference in 
accounting for these two purposes. (Accounting policy 
specialist, large European energy company)
At the moment these differences in the use and origins of 
CERs and EUAs are not being reflected in financial 
statements, as evidenced in Figure 4.3. This may well 
change in the future, with growth in the volumes of CERs 
generated and traded.
Figure 4.4 shows that eight companies (or 31% of the 
sample) measure granted allowances at nil value. Only four 
companies follow the treatment suggested in the 
withdrawn IFRIC 3 recommendations, which is to measure 
allowances at fair value at date of receipt, with this amount 
being treated as deferred income on the balance sheet. 
Again, there is diversity in accounting practices, with a 
high proportion of companies not disclosing any data (six 
of 26 companies, or 23% of the sample), and a high 
proportion following a mix of different accounting practices 
(identified here as ‘Other’ and representing eight of the 26 
surveyed companies, or 31% of the sample).
No disclosure
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figure 4.3: Cers – initial recognition
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figure 4.4: granted allowances – measurement on initial 
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Figure 4.5 illustrates how companies measure emission 
allowances after initial recognition. Once again there is 
little disclosure in this area. In the main, the lack of 
disclosure is due to the choice of initial valuation of 
emission allowances. If allowances are valued at nil (and 
they were by a significant proportion of companies: eight 
of the 26 companies, translating to 31% of the sample) 
then amortisation/depreciation is not possible. Indeed, one 
interviewee noted this.
When the granted allowances are recorded at a nil value, 
there is nothing to depreciate…when it is not necessary 
to disclose parties don’t want to give an insight in their 
positions.9 (Head of finance, large European energy 
company)
Another interviewee questioned more fundamentally 
whether it made sense to view emission allowances as 
being depreciated. This individual implied that emission 
allowances should be recognised as inventory and charged 
as a production cost, rather than recognising them as 
intangibles:
But is it really a depreciation? It all depends what these 
allowances are used for…the biggest portion is granted 
by the government, your shortfall you can buy on the 
market…. So when you produce electricity you are also 
producing carbon dioxide. And at the end of the year you 
have to deliver the allowances to the government again. 
So I don’t know if it is really a depreciation. It is not a 
depreciation in the P & L [profit and loss], it is part of 
your cost price. (Accounting policy specialist, large 
European energy company)
9.  This quote also suggests that there is a tendency to avoid disclosure if 
at all possible.
Again, this quote highlights the degree of uncertainty 
about accounting for emission allowances, including what 
type of ‘thing’ an EUA actually is (a point returned to in the 
discussion below). It seems that the question of 
amortisation/depreciation has not been settled in practice, 
because more fundamental definitional problems are still 
unresolved. Although IFRIC 3 was based on the 
assumption that emission allowances represent a right to 
emit and thus are intangible assets, this may or may not 
be the final conclusion of the IASB and FASB Emissions 
Trading Schemes project.
Revaluation of emission allowances in financial statements 
is required when the market values of these assets change. 
The survey findings in this area again reveal low levels of 
disclosure, with half the companies having no disclosure in 
this area (see Figure 4.6). For those that do disclose, most 
companies (11, or 42%) revalue and recognise this change 
in the income statement. 
In summary, emission allowance assets are accounted for 
in the companies of the EU ETS in a variety of different 
ways, and non-disclosure is common. EUAs are typically 
classified as intangible assets, and are usually measured at 
nil value. CERs are generally not distinguished from EUAs 
in company accounts, if there is disclosure of them at all. 
Practices of depreciation and revaluation of emission 
allowances are also difficult to discern as non-disclosure is 
high. 
No disclosure
No, allowances are not 
amortised/depreciated
No, allowances are 
amortised/depreciated
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figure 4.5: Amortisation/depreciation
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figure 4.6: revaluation of emission allowances
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TreATmenT of liAbiliTies
Figure 4.7 describes how companies are accounting for 
emission allowance liabilities. Once again, a significant 
number of companies make no disclosure in this area (six 
of the 26 companies, or 23% of the sample). Most 
companies (15 companies, or 58% of the sample) value 
the obligation based on the carrying value (cost) of 
allowances already granted/purchased (which, in practice, 
tends to be zero), with the balance valued at the prevailing 
market price. Four companies follow a slightly amended 
version of this accounting practice, with emission 
allowances purchased under forward contract prices 
shown at the contract price. These accounting practices 
were not permitted under IFRIC 3. IFRIC 3 recommended 
that assets (the allowances) should be treated 
independently of liabilities, as follows.
A liability should be recognised as emissions are made, •	
and the liability should be categorised as a ‘provision’ 
and, hence, should be treated in accordance with IAS 
37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets).
The liability should be measured at fair value (that is, •	
the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle 
the present obligation at the balance sheet date), 
independently of the cost of the allowances already 
owned by the company. 
The interviews gave further insights into why most 
companies have followed the ‘cost with balance at market 
value’ approach. As in the case of assets, the absence of 
firm rules appears to have resulted in the adoption of the 
easiest accounting policy. Moreover, this accounting 
approach was favoured as it does not require full 
disclosure of assets and liabilities. The choice reflected 
here is, however, tied into the practice whereby 
governments have granted allowances at no charge in the 
early Phases (1 & 2) of the EU ETS. Effectively, measuring 
allowances ‘at cost’ means assigning them a nil value 
because they are not paid for. It follows that liabilities can 
therefore also be measured at cost (that is, at nil value). As 
one interviewee explains, accounting for emission 
allowances in this way helps companies to keep assets and 
liabilities to a minimum.
With [emission] allowances we focus on an approach to 
keep the balance sheet on both sides rather low. And if 
we focus on intangible assets we can value the 
allowances at cost and the corresponding provision also 
at cost. So this is rather low. And we are only accounting 
for the shortfall at fair value, or at the best estimate…I 
think this is the easiest way in the end. (Accounting 
policy specialist, large European energy company)
With a shift in Phase 3 of the EU ETS towards auctioning of 
allowances (see Chapter 2) there may be an impetus for a 
change in accounting practices in this area. In particular, it 
is likely that this will lead to fuller recognition of both 
assets and liabilities. Rather surprisingly, however, none of 
the companies interviewed was clear about the 
implications of auctioning for emission allowance 
accounting, as one interviewee demonstrated.
So after [the year] 2012, yes, then there will be an 
auction by the government…so that can change the 
[accounting] approach, [but] nobody knows…Is there an 
auction for each year, or for a period of five years? Again, 
is there banking and borrowing in that period? These are 
more the practical outcomes that you have to transfer in, 
accounting-wise. (Head of finance, large European 
energy company)
A second rationale given for the lack of disclosure of 
liabilities relates to companies’ desire for secrecy. This 
preference for keeping information undisclosed arises 
because emission allowances are viewed as being 
politically high profile and because full disclosure might 
reveal something about the company strategy towards 
holding allowances. Another interviewee explained their 
perception as to why there was a lack of disclosure.
Actually, I think, one of the reasons is also that companies 
do not want others to know whether they have an excess 
of credits, or have a lack of credits.
At carrying value for allowances 
already granted/purchased, with 
the balance valued at the 
prevailing market price 
No disclosure
At carrying value for allowances 
already granted/purchased and at 
the relative contract price for 
allowances to be purchased under 
forward purchase contracts, with 
the balance valued at the 
prevailing market price 
At the prevailing market price of 
allowances for the entire 
obligation 
15
6
4
1
Number of companies
figure 4.7: measurement of liabilities
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When asked if this was a strategic concern, the same 
interviewee replied: 
Yes. And also now because these allocations are made by 
the government of the country for each [sector/company] 
and this is additional information that is not provided…
that is not publicly available…The [company] calculation 
of the liability actually depends on the actual emissions 
and they may differ from the initially reported data. So 
maybe that is another reason. (General manager of 
accounting and consolidation, European iron and steel 
company)
In summary, as with emission allowance assets, there is 
diversity in the accounting treatment of liabilities, and a 
considerable level of non-disclosure. Most of the sample 
companies (58%) value the obligation on the basis of the 
cost of allowances already granted/purchased, which is 
usually close to zero, with the shortfall of allowances for 
the year measured at the market value. In practice, this 
means that the only liability recognition in the financial 
statements is for shortfalls in allowances.
inTerview AnAlysis: AddiTionAl findings
Several issues arise from the research interviews, above 
and beyond findings from the financial report survey, and 
these are discussed briefly here. They include:
the accounting implications of having an unclear •	
definition of an emission allowance
the role of auditors in this area•	
future expectations of companies with respect to •	
accounting standards.
defining an emission allowance
Several interviewees comment on the difficulties in 
defining and classifying emission allowances (see Chapter 
3). Crucially, links were made between these more 
conceptual issues (for example, questioning if an EUA is a 
financial instrument or a property right) and accounting 
practices. As one interviewee commented:
It is not clear for us, but...also for tax lawyers, what is the 
nature, the essence of the emission granted? The 
question is: are we dealing with a right, or a security, or 
an inventory?…We are not sure…It is [therefore] not 
possible to clearly define which is the proper presentation 
in the financial statement…
The individual continued:
Given the fact that it is not clear...we continue to apply 
our approach in terms of nil, no recognition for the 
allowances. (Head of accounting principles and 
standards, large European energy company)
For this interviewee, part of the explanation for the low 
level of disclosure of EUAs in financial statements is the 
absence of a clear definition of the nature of emission 
allowances. Interestingly, the solution to this problem is 
seen as coming from the European Commission. 
Specifically, the interviewee suggested that:
We believe that the European Community [SIC] has to 
define, to clearly define, the nature of the emission 
[allowance]. Because, in my opinion, the standard setter 
[does not have a]…duty…to identify what is a legal point 
of view or a tax point of view. They are not legal setters…
But the accounting approach cannot arise before the 
identification of the legal nature. (Head of accounting 
principles and standards, large European energy 
company). 
Discussions about the definition and classification of 
emission allowances are indeed progressing in the 
European Commission (see Bank of England 2009), and 
are under review by the IASB and FASB as part of their 
Emissions Trading Schemes project. The resolution of this 
matter is likely to influence the accounting treatments 
adopted.
The role of auditors
Most interviewees indicated that they sought guidance 
from their auditors on approaches to accounting for 
emission allowances and suggested that auditors play a 
key role in facilitating the convergence of accounting 
practices in the absence of an international standard. In 
this respect, auditors appear to be acting as a type of 
intermediary, collating information from different 
companies and recommending best practices. For 
example, an interviewee stated:
One of the sources that we use when deciding the 
accounting treatment is our auditor’s interpretation, 
because we have access to their databases – their 
interpretations of the accounting standards and also 
preferred accounting treatments…their interpretations 
include several options, and we choose one of them…The 
reason is that they have access to different companies, 
different entities that may have such kind of transactions, 
and we do not have any relationship to any other 
companies other than trading relations. So this is one 
source of how we can get information [on] how other 
companies are doing this [accounting for emission 
allowances]. (General manager of accounting and 
consolidation, European iron and steel company)
Another interviewee confirmed this reliance on advice from 
auditors, but indicated also that they engage in direct 
discussions with other companies, noting that:
We are in constant discussion with our auditors and they 
are also focusing on what all the industry practices are. 
We are also sharing information, well, on an informal level, 
with other companies in this sector, on how they account 
for [emission allowances]. (Accounting policy specialist, 
large European energy company)
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The International Energy Accounting Forum (IEAF) was 
mentioned by two interviewees as an example of the kind 
of network where information on emission allowances 
accounting practices is shared. Indeed, there is an active 
discussion on emission allowances accounting by IEAF 
(see IEAF 2010). It is evident that more informal discussion 
also takes place at a company-to-company level.
The expectations of companies with respect to accounting 
standards 
Most companies interviewed would welcome new joint 
guidance on emission allowances from the IASB and FASB. 
The opinion was expressed that it was preferable to have 
clarity on how to account for emission allowances as this 
would make it easier for companies because they would 
not have to follow a range of different guidance (for 
example, guidance at national and international levels) and 
because it would enable fair comparison between 
companies. Two interviewees provided contrasting 
comments on this issue.
Every year we end up in a different situation and it is 
different from what we had before and cannot find any 
guidance. So really, we would appreciate something that 
is complex and covers all kind of transactions that may 
arise. (General manager of accounting and 
consolidation, European iron and steel company)
In contrast, another interviewee was less focused on 
receiving guidance from IASB and FASB, stating:
Well, to be honest, I am very sceptical about these 
organisations…We started in 2005 [with the EU ETS], so 
there is a five-year gap. Honestly, I don’t care now…So 
the question [is], will [it] be helpful? Well, maybe we have 
to change something, but it will be for external reporting, 
it will not help in our management reporting whatsoever.
They are late, the whole process from the first draft until 
a final approved standard, that takes years and years. 
They are not acting very fast. (Head of finance, large 
European energy company)
Very few of those interviewed were actively tracking the 
decision making of the IASB/FASB Emissions Trading 
Schemes project, mostly owing to a lack of time and 
resources to do so, but for some it was related to the 
perceived irrelevance of standards. This finding indicates 
there may be some problems for the IASB and FASB in 
gaining support for their proposals, and possibly in gaining 
sufficient feedback and industry response to the Emissions 
Trading Schemes Exposure Draft when it is ultimately 
issued.
summAry
In summary, in this chapter we have presented and 
analysed results from our financial statements survey and 
telephone interviews. A third of the companies surveyed 
(eight of 26) are initially accounting for carbon assets at nil 
value on the rationale that allowances are issued at no 
charge. This may change in the future because in Phase 3 
of the EU ETS there is a shift towards EUAs being paid for 
by companies. A large proportion of companies (58%) are 
valuing the obligation on the basis of the cost of 
allowances already granted/purchased, and measuring the 
balance at the market value, a practice that implies 
accounting only for their shortfall in allowances. Interviews 
with accountants revealed a role for auditors in guiding 
accounting treatment in the absence of international 
accounting standards, and provided evidence that these 
interviewees would welcome timely international 
accounting guidance from IASB and FASB.
A key finding is that large emitters within the EU ETS are 
using a diversity of accounting practices to account for 
emission allowances: there is no uniformity of treatment, 
and the incidence of non-disclosure is high. The fact that 
some companies have not disclosed their emission 
allowances may be explained by their relatively low 
materiality (see Table 2.1). Nonetheless, it is important to 
highlight that our survey has shown that some companies 
presented incomplete information on emissions 
allowances: for example, recognising allowances on the 
balance sheet as intangible assets, but with no detail about 
whether allowances are (or are not) amortised. Our results 
indicate there is a lack of standardisation in practice on 
emission allowance disclosure, not only with regard to how 
to account for allowances, but also regarding what should 
be considered the minimum of information provided in 
order for users to understand the treatment of allowances 
in different parts of financial statements.
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summAry
It is clear from our empirical analysis that there is 
considerable diversity in accounting practices for EU ETS 
emission allowances. Most companies are not following 
IFRIC 3 (the original international accounting guidance 
issued in late 2004). This is perhaps not surprising given 
the opposition that this standard attracted, and that led to 
its subsequent withdrawal. Having said that, some 
elements of IFRIC 3 appear to have influenced accounting 
practices adopted in the sample companies. For example, 
42% of the sample companies (11 of the 26 companies) 
treated emission allowances as intangible assets. In 
contrast to IFRIC 3 draft guidance, these assets are mostly 
assigned a nil value in company accounts (by 31%, or 
eight of the 26 companies reviewed), reflecting the fact 
that in Phase 1 and 2 of the EU ETS allowances have 
predominantly been allocated at no charge. Only 15% (or 
four of the 26 companies) are in line with the withdrawn 
IFRIC 3 guidance by accounting for emission allowances 
initially at fair value (that is, at market price), with the 
difference between fair value and cost recognised as 
governmental grant (deferred income) on the balance 
sheet. 
Following on from the common practice of classifying 
emission allowances as intangible assets and measuring 
them at nil value, most companies do not disclose any 
information on amortisation/depreciation (69%, or 18 of 
the 26 companies) and half the surveyed companies fail to 
disclose data on the revaluation of emission allowances 
(50%, or 13 of the 26 companies). Information on Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs), which can be used 
interchangeably with EUAs, similarly has very low levels of 
disclosure (with an incidence of 77%, or 20 of the 26 
surveyed companies failing to disclose such information). 
It is unclear if these companies are holding CERs or not so 
this level of non-disclosure is difficult to interpret.
Companies’ accounting treatment for reporting on their 
net position with respect to emission allowances varies 
considerably, with most of the surveyed companies 
accounting for their obligations by following a ‘cost with 
balance at market value’ approach (15 of the 26 
companies; 58%). This results in a lack of information on 
the full extent of emission allowances assets and liabilities 
and is in contrast to the treatment originally 
recommended by IFRIC 3.
The interviews with accountants based in a subset of the 
surveyed companies gave further insight into the reasons 
for accounting diversity. In short, it appears that the main 
reason for the diversity of approach is the ability to choose 
accounting practices because of the absence of 
international accounting guidance. The accountants also 
raised an issue of more fundamental uncertainty about 
what type of ‘thing’ an emission allowance is: a financial 
instrument, a property right, part of the production 
process, a compliance instrument, etc. In the face of this 
uncertainty the role of auditors in providing advice and 
guidance on possible accounting treatment is important. 
Most companies interviewed said they would welcome firm 
guidance from standard setters.
In this short, concluding chapter we now turn to consider 
the implications of our findings across three areas: for 
accounting standard setters, for companies within the EU 
ETS, and for accounting theory.
ACCounTing sTAndArd seTTers
There is a diversity of accounting treatment of emission 
allowances in the EU ETS and this situation has arisen 
because of a lack of accounting guidance from standard 
setters in the period 2005–10.
This diversity in accounting practice means that company 
accounts of large EU ETS emitters cannot, in most cases, 
be directly compared, even though emission allowances 
are likely to be material to at least some of the companies. 
Companies interviewed appeared ready to welcome 
guidance from the accounting standard setters because 
they believed that it will reduce complexity for them and 
allow them to be fairly compared against their peers.
Even so, few companies have been tracking the progress of 
the IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes project, and 
they have had little (if any) direct engagement with IASB or 
FASB.
In the continuing absence of international guidance the 
role of auditors has been important, with most companies 
interviewed seeking information and reassurance from 
auditors about their choices. Auditors have been playing a 
role in establishing best practice through issuing guidance 
and briefing papers (see, for example, KPMG 2008; 
Deloitte 2009; Ernst and Young 2010).
We recommend that accounting standard setters issue 
clear guidance on emission allowance accounting as soon 
as is practical (noting that the timetable has already 
slipped further from an Exposure Draft that was due in 
2009 to one now due in late 2011). As time goes on, the 
importance of resolving this area will grow as EU ETS 
emission allowances will be auctioned in EU ETS Phase 3 
(which commences in 2013). A level playing field for 
accounting treatment and disclosure is required to allow 
fair and transparent comparison of EU ETS financial 
statements. 
5. summary and conclusions
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eu eTs emiTTers
Companies in the EU ETS are currently free to choose their 
preferred accounting method for emission allowances (as 
long as it is accepted by their auditor). This flexibility 
brings both advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantages are that companies can choose the accounting 
method that suits their business best and that is easiest 
and simplest for them to apply. The disadvantages are that 
comparability between companies is not possible, and that 
companies may need to invest time and resources in 
seeking information about, and adopting different 
accounting models for, emission allowances in order to 
satisfy different regulators/parent companies/new 
auditors, and yet still face uncertainty as to the 
appropriateness of the method adopted.
With most companies in the EU ETS following a ‘cost with 
balance at market value’ approach that amounts to just 
accounting for their net position (15 of the 26 companies, 
or 58% of the sample) it is not currently possible to 
ascertain from company accounts the full extent of 
companies’ emission allowance assets and liabilities. As a 
result, users of financial statements are unable to assess 
how much of companies’ risk is derived from carbon 
emissions and carbon markets.
With a shift to auctioning allowances in Phase 3 of the EU 
ETS there are likely to be knock-on accounting 
implications, not least that companies will no longer be 
able to account for assets and liabilities at nil value 
(because allowances will no longer be allocated at no 
charge). Companies appear not to be thinking ahead about 
this issue. Although auctioning will alleviate the accounting 
problem of the initial valuation of allowances, there is likely 
to be scope for differences between the price at auctioning 
and fair value, because of market volatility in the price of 
EUAs.
There are some industry networks in which companies 
discuss emission allowance accounting issues but 
participation is variable, with some companies having no 
such discussions with their peers, and relying heavily on 
their auditor for advice.
We recommend the launching of information networks, to 
include large emitters in the EU ETS, technical 
accountants, and industry experts, which could serve to 
exchange information to try to harmonise accounting 
practices in the run up to the issuance of guidance by 
IASB/FASB, and to engage with any standard-setting 
process they follow.
ACCounTing Theory
Our empirical research adds to an emerging body of work 
on accounting for carbon (Bebbington and Larrinaga-
Gonzalez 2008; Lohmann 2009; MacKenzie 2009) and 
confirms that, as yet, there is nothing habitual about 
accounting practices in this area. This creates possibilities 
for an interesting case study for the understanding of 
accounting rules and practices in the making.
Emission allowances are hard to classify. They are a type 
of ‘incommensurable’ because there are multiple potential 
uses of allowances (as a commodity, a currency and a 
financial instrument) and accounting practitioners in the 
EU ETS are trying to deal with this complexity.
Through their struggle to define and manage emission 
allowances, EU ETS accountants are playing a role in 
influencing how the problem of climate change is 
comprehended and governed, albeit at the moment in a 
rather narrowly defined technical arena.
With a scheduled shift to auctioning of emission 
allowances in the EU ETS, and forthcoming guidance from 
standard setters, financial accounting in this area is likely 
to be increasingly controversial, and may attract attention 
from beyond accounting networks and thereby widen the 
range of parties who will be involved in creating carbon 
markets. The inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders 
into accounting debates is to be broadly welcomed, as it 
will raise the profile of these issues, and will facilitate 
greater feedback from users of financial reports.
Recognising that carbon markets have been created by 
governments and other institutions opens up the 
possibilities for changing how they work, including their 
financial accounting ‘bedrock’. Large corporate emitters in 
the EU ETS and auditors both have the possibility of 
effecting change in how accounting for emission 
allowances is done, but timing is crucial. It is the next few 
years (2010–13) that will be most important because of 
the shift to auctioning of allowances, and the expected 
issuance of IASB/FASB guidance in this area.
Academic research on accounting for emission allowances 
raises questions that are not only technical but also 
conceptual in nature. The study of the particular issues 
that emerge in accounting for emission allowances 
demonstrates uncertainty about its outcome and as such 
can help us to understand accounting principles and 
practices in the making. 
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poliCy reCommendATions
In summary, our policy recommendations are as follows.
We recommend that accounting standard setters issue 
clear guidance on emission allowance accounting as soon 
as is practical (noting that the timetable has already 
slipped from an Exposure Draft that was due in 2009 to 
one now due in late 2011). As time goes on, the 
importance of resolving this area will grow as EU ETS 
emission allowances will be auctioned in EU ETS Phase 3 
(which commences in 2013). A level playing field for 
accounting treatment and disclosure is required to allow 
fair and transparent comparison of EU ETS financial 
statements.
We recommend the launching of information networks, to 
include large emitters in the EU ETS, technical 
accountants, and industry experts, which could serve to 
exchange information to try to harmonise accounting 
practices in the run up to the issuance of guidance by 
IASB/FASB, and to engage with any standard-setting 
process they follow. 
We recommend that academic research on carbon 
accounting (financial or otherwise) is continued, as there is 
much to explore, and now is an excellent time to have 
valuable policy input. 
issues for furTher reseArCh
The research could be furthered in the following ways.
Financial accounting treatments adopted in other •	
Emissions Trading Schemes (for example, in the US 
state trading schemes) could be investigated as they 
develop so as to have a comparison to the EU ETS.
A wider EU ETS survey could be carried out, •	
incorporating more companies active in the EU ETS, 
including smaller emitters, and a greater range of 
industry sectors.
The existence and desirability of national variations •	
emerging among member states of the EU could be 
investigated, with regard to rules and practices of 
accounting for emission allowances (and in the absence 
of an international standard).
The relationship between the legal definition of an •	
emission allowance and accounting standard setting 
could be investigated. Specifically, will the legal 
definition being developed by the European Community 
affect accounting regulations for emission allowances? 
And, if so, how?
An in-depth examination could be made of the •	
accounting implications of a shift to auctioning of 
allowances proposed in Phase 3, with an evaluation of 
whether or not companies and auditors are preparing 
for this change. 
A more detailed empirical investigation of how •	
companies, auditors and standard setters share best 
practice on emission allowance accounting could be 
carried out. For example, are emission allowance 
accounting standards emerging from what was best 
practice in the period 2005–10, or are they being 
developed by IASB and FASB largely in isolation from 
current practice?
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33ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON APPENDIX: QUESTIONS AND CATEGORIES FOR ANALYSIS
1 Where are granted allowances initially recognised on the balance sheet?
1.a Debtors
1.b Inventory
1.c Tangible fixed assets
1.d Intangible fixed assets
1.e Other
2 Where are purchased allowances recorded on the balance sheet?
2.a Debtors
2.b Inventory
2.c Tangible fixed assets
2.d Intangible fixed assets
2.e Activity-based model
2.f Other
3 How are purchased CERs initially recognised on the balance sheet?
3.a Debtors
3.b Inventory
3.c Tangible fixed assets
3.d Intangible fixed assets
3.e Other
4  At what value are granted allowances initially recognised on the balance sheet?
4.a  At fair value at the date of receipt, with opposite entry recognised as deferred income on the balance sheet
4.b At fair value at date of receipt, with opposite entry recognised immediately in income statement
4.c At nil value
4.d Other
5 Are granted/purchased allowances subsequently amortised/depreciated?
5.a Yes, allowances are amortised / depreciated
5.b No, allowances are not amortised / depreciated
5.c No disclosure
6 Are granted/purchased allowances revalued subsequent to initial receipt/purchase?
6.a No
6.b Yes, with revaluation taken to the income statement
6.c Yes, with revaluation taken to reserves
6.d Other
7 How is the obligation for emissions valued?
7.a At the prevailing market price of allowances for the entire obligation
7.b At carrying value for allowances already granted / purchased, with the balance valued at the prevailing market price
7.c
At carrying value for allowances already granted / purchased and at the relative contract price for allowances to be purchased under 
forward purchase contracts, with the balance valued at the prevailing market price
7.d No obligation is recognised unless there is a shortfall, with the balance valued at the prevailing market price
7.e
No obligation is recognised unless there is a shortfall, at the relative contract price for allowances to be purchased under forward purchase 
contracts, with the balance valued at the prevailing market price
7.f Other
Source: Taken (with slight modifications) from the PricewaterhouseCoopers and International Emissions Trading Association survey, as described in PWC 
and IETA (2007).
Appendix: Questions and categories for analysis
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